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MARGINS OF APPRECIATION: CULTURAL RELATIVITY AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
JAMES A SWEENEY* 
Lecturer, Newcastle Law School, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
 
The number of states participating in the Council of Europe’s system for the 
protection of human rights has grown rapidly over recent years.  Established in 1949 
with an initial membership of 10 states, the Council has now grown to a membership 
of 46,2 dwarfing the EU in its geographical reach.  The most significant period of 
enlargement has been since the end of the Cold War as the formerly Communist states 
from central and eastern Europe flocked to the Council of Europe seeking assistance 
with the process of democratisation.  The Council’s most prominent human rights 
treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, has entered into force for all but 
                                                 
1 Elements of this article were delivered as a paper at the McCoubrey Centre for International Law, 
University of Hull, in November 2003.  The research presented is derived from doctoral work 
completed at the University of Hull under the supervision of Dr W John Hopkins, Dr Lindsay Moir and 
the late Prof Hilaire McCoubrey; Sweeney, ‘Margins of appreciation, cultural relativity and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (PhD thesis on file at the University of Hull).  Thanks also to Prof. 
Ian Ward at Newcastle Law School who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this article.    
2 ‘The Council of Europe’s Member States’ (Council of Europe) 
<http://www.coe.int/T/e/com/about_coe/member_states/default.asp> (14 October 2004).  The most 
recent state to join was Monaco on the 5th October 2004. 
  
one of the 46 member states.3  This paper questions whether the European Court of 
Human Rights’ recognition of a national ‘margin of appreciation’ has allowed these 
new Contracting Parties too much leeway in the way they choose to protect, or more 
specifically, to limit, the exercise of human rights.   
 
It is shown below that there have been concerns about the margin of appreciation 
doctrine’s perceived culturally relativist basis.  It had been feared that the expansion 
of the Convention system would exacerbate the existing problems.  In responding to 
these concerns it is argued that the variations permitted by the use of the margin of 
appreciation concept do not amount to cultural relativism.  Instead, a view of the 
interaction of national and international human rights protection based upon 
institutional subsidiarity and a form of “ethical decentralisation” is proposed, based in 
part upon Michael Walzer’s work on thick and thin moral concepts.4 
 
The paper first sets out the parameters of the universality debate, and then goes on to 
introduce and evaluate some of the recent and controversial judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights.     
 
UNIVERSALITY AND RELATIVISM 
 
                                                 
3 Monaco signed the ECHR and its protocols on the 5th October when it joined the Council, but it has 
yet to ratify them. 
4 M Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral argument at home and abroad (Notre Dame University of Notre 
Dame Press 1994) 
  
The universality of human rights is founded on the understanding that if all humans 
are equal, then the rights that they hold as a result of being human are the same 
regardless of the culture into which the individual happens to be born.5  This is the 
fundamental justification for the ideals expressed internationally in the work of 
United Nations and also regionally by the Council of Europe.  
 
Cultural relativists have argued that the concept of human rights is a western liberal 
idea and has no (or a different) value outside of the western context.  They contend 
that universalists fail to understand their own enculturation and the resulting 
unconscious bias of their position.  Any system of social justice grounded in a given 
culture is a defence of the good life as conceptualised by that system, regardless of its 
substantive content.  The values promoted by the system are relative only to the 
society from which they are derived and are incapable of universality.  It is 
unjustifiable to impose upon one society a system of social justice deriving from 
another.  The imposed system would be culturally alien and adherence to it could not 
be guaranteed.6 
 
Even from within a human rights system the extent to which a relativist position is 
adopted can pose problems for the protection of human rights.  The difficulty is that 
wherever there is a plurality of possible meanings for a given human right, then 
                                                 
5 For an introduction to this justification for human rights, and to alternative justifications, see J 
Shestack, ‘The philosophical foundations of human rights’ in Symonides (ed), Human Rights: 
Concepts and Standards, (Aldershot Ashgate / Dartmouth 2000)  
6 A An-Na’im, ‘Human Rights in the Muslim World’, 3 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1990) 13.  
This perspective informs An-Na’im’s efforts to demonstrate that human rights values are in fact not 
alien to Islam. 
  
without the philosophical means to make value judgments about the desirability of 
different meanings or approaches, the relativist is compelled to tolerate any 
permutation of the right in question.7  The relativist is incapable of moral criticism 
because each differing morality is equally valid.  Thus in the name of respect for local 
culture, the international observer of human rights abuses is robbed of his or her 
critical faculties.  However, a careful examination of relativism’s theoretical 
foundations exposes significant logical problems with its arguments.   
 
Firstly, as a prescriptive theory, cultural relativism contradicts itself.  As Fernando 
Teson has written, ‘if it is true that no universal moral principles exist, then the 
relativist engages in self-contradiction by stating the universality of the relativist 
principle.’8  Similarly Alison Dundes Renteln argued that relativism9 is susceptible to 
the charge of self-refutation because, ‘it asserts the absolute prescription that all 
prescriptions are relative.’10  Moreover, in spite of their purposed opposition to 
universal values, relativists reserve for themselves at least one universal value – that 
we should follow, and be defined by, our own culture.  Notwithstanding the 
                                                 
7 This type of relativism is what Teson has referred to as ‘metaethical relativism’. (F Teson, 
‘International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism’ 25 Virginia Journal of International Law (1985) 
869, 886).  Note however that Alison Renteln has argued that the premise of this type of relativism 
(labelled by her as ‘ethical relativism as descriptive (factual) hypothesis’) does not actually imply 
tolerance. (A Renteln, International Human Rights – Universalism Versus Relativism, (New York Sage 
Publications 1990)   
8 Teson (n7) 888  
9 By relativism, Renteln was referring to the particular strand she described as ‘ethical relativism as 
prescriptive (value) hypothesis’. 
10 Renteln (n7) 72 
  
conservative tendencies of such a position, it serves to demonstrate that the relativists 
have not explained the foundation of their argument. 
 
The second main theoretical problem with relativism can be described as the 
‘tolerance trap’.  If it is conceded that there is no universal meaning to ‘human rights’, 
the existence in relative harmony of the varying conceptions of ‘human rights’ 
necessitates their tolerance.  Indeed this is the core argument of the relativists.  Thus 
we should tolerate and respect the choices made by unfamiliar systems of social 
justice because they promote what is valued by that particular society.  The logical 
problem here is that relativism seeks to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ in violation of 
the Humean dichotomy between normative and descriptive propositions.11  The 
observation that cultural values vary from society to society, and that therefore what is 
held worthy of protection also varies, is a description of a factual situation.  The ‘call 
for tolerance’12 is, on the other hand, a normative judgment about what ought to be.  
A normative proposition such as ‘we ought to tolerate diverse cultures’ can not be 
inferred from a purely factual statement such as ‘there are diverse cultures’.  It is one 
thing for colonial invaders to recognise that the locals have a different culture to them.  
It is quite another to halt the invasion on that basis. 
 
There are considerable complications to both of these arguments, but for the purposes 
of this paper it is sufficient to recognise that the philosophical pedigree of cultural 
                                                 
11 E Hatch, Culture and Morality, (New York Columbia University Press 1983) 67 
12 ibid 
  
relativism is at least questionable.13  Of more immediate importance is the way that, 
in spite of its logical weaknesses, the rhetoric of cultural relativism has been high-
jacked by political elites in order to repress their own population.14  In this way 
culture may sometimes be motivated as a state’s untouchable ‘trump card’ reason fo
failing to comply (fully) with human rights standards.  Less controversially, relativism
tends to be equated with a conservative view of public international law that affords 
greater respect to state sovereignty (which is to some extent challenged by 
international human rights law).  This is a view that dominated socialist public 
international law and which could be expected to linger in the heritage of new 
Contracting Parties to the ECHR from central and eastern Eu
r 
 
rope.15     
                                                
 
In the European context the importance of recognising tensions between universality 
and relativism has thus become clearer since the end of the Cold War.  The resulting 
expansion of the Council of Europe is seen as a threat to the standards already put in 
place by the European Court.  The former communist states have a different historical 
and legal background, and may seek to narrow the scope of the protected rights.  The 
way that the Court leaves a ‘margin of appreciation’ to states has been singled out as 
 
13 J Tilley, ‘Cultural Relativism’ 22 Human Rights Quarterly (2000) 501 contains a more intensive 
critique of cultural relativism 
14 Donnelly, Universal human rights in theory and practice, (New York Cornell University Press 1989) 
119; Higgins, Problems and Processes in International Law, (Oxford OUP 1994) 96 
15 The USSR for example historically treated human rights as an aspect of their ‘domestic jurisdiction’ 
(Art. 2(7) Charter of the UN) and vigorously promoted a policy on non-interference.  On the first steps 
towards Russia’s modification of this attitude see T Schweisfurth, ‘The Acceptance by the Soviet 
Union of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ for Six Human Rights Conventions’ 2 European 
Journal of International Law (1991) 110 
  
the means by which relativism will find its way into the Convention jurisprudence.  In 
order to assess such arguments it is necessary first to introduce the margin of 
appreciation itself. 
 
THE EUROPEAN MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
 
The Court allows states a certain discretion to ‘do things their own way’ from time to 
time.  This ‘margin of appreciation’ can be distinguished from the general discretion 
left by the Convention to states in how to implement detailed human rights protection 
in their domestic law.16  The idea of a margin of appreciation is used in the Court’s 
reasoning to measure and police states’ discretion to interfere with or otherwise limit 
human rights in specific instances.  In essence it expresses that Contracting Parties 
have some space in which they can balance for themselves conflicting public goods.  
The practice of recognising and respecting states’ margin of appreciation is derived 
from the case law of the Court and Commission, not from the text of the Convention 
itself.  Its relevance can be raised by the Court on its own initiative, or by the 
Contracting Parties themselves, by way of a ‘defence’ to the allegation that they have 
violated a Convention right. 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine’s implications for universality can be seen as far 
back as the well-known 1976 case of Handyside.17  The European Court was called 
upon to discuss to what extent free expression could be limited in order to protect 
morals.  The Court stated that, 
                                                 
16 As required by Art 1 ECHR 
17 Handyside v UK Series A No 24 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737 
  
It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform 
European conception of morals.  The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements 
of morals varies from time to time and from place to place which is characterised by a rapid 
and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject….  Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 
leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation.18 [emphasis added]  
 
The Court thus appeared to recognise some form of inter-temporal, European, moral 
diversity.  Such comments have provoked hostile reactions to the continued 
recognition of a national margin of appreciation.  For example Lord Lester has 
expressed his deep concern in the following terms: 
The danger of continuing to use the standardless doctrine of the margin of appreciation is that, 
especially in the enlarged Council of Europe, it will become the source of a pernicious 
'variable' geometry of human rights, eroding the acquis of existing jurisprudence and giving 
undue deference to local conditions, traditions, and practices.19     
 
Lord Lester’s concerns are not isolated.  Eyal Benvenisti has added that, 
The juridical output of the [European Court of Human Rights] and other international bodies 
carries the promise of setting universal standards for the protection and promotion of human 
rights.  These universal aspirations are, to a large extent, compromised by the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation….  Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral 
relativism is at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights.20 
 
                                                 
18 ibid para 48 
19 A Lester, ‘Universality versus subsidiarity: a reply’ 1 European Human Rights Law Review (1998) 
73, 76  
20 E Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’, 31 New York 
University Journal of International Law (1999) 843, 844  
  
These criticisms are not confined to commentators.  Judge De Meyer, in his partly 
dissenting Opinion in the Convention case of Z v Finland, was particularly critical of 
the doctrine; 
In the present judgment the Court once again relies on the national authorities' "margin of 
appreciation". I believe that it is high time for the Court to banish that concept from its 
reasoning. It has already delayed too long in abandoning this hackneyed phrase and recanting 
the relativism it implies.21 
 
These concerns have only been amplified by the expansion of the Council of Europe.  
For example in 1999 Paul Mahoney asked, 
Will the ECHR standards be diluted, not just to accommodate the problems of the fledgling 
democracies [of central and eastern Europe], but generally, across the board for the whole of 
the ECHR community?  Will the principles painstakingly built up over the years in the 
jurisprudence of the Commission and Court be left by the wayside?22 
 
Likewise Lord Lester’s suspicion of the margin of appreciation concept was 
‘increased by the fact that the Court's territorial jurisdiction is being rapidly widened 
to cover the inhabitants of some forty European countries of diverse political cultural 
backgrounds and traditions.’23  
 
                                                 
21 Z v Finland Reports 1997-I (1998) 25 EHRR 371, Partly dissenting Opinion of Judge De Meyer, Part 
III.  Judge De Meyer made similar comments in the footnote to his separate concurring opinion in 
Ahmed & Others v UK Reports 1998-VI (2000) 29 EHRR 1  
22 P Mahoney, ‘Speculating on the future of the reformed European Court of Human Rights’, 20 
Human Rights Law Journal (1999) 1, 3 
23 Lester (n19) 74 
  
The assumption seems to be that the margin of appreciation has its roots in cultural 
relativism.  Moreover now that the Court must deal with the varying cultural and 
developmental situations of the new Contracting Parties, it will be compelled to 
tolerate practices that threaten the universality of human rights.  As has already been 
established, a relativistic approach would be theoretically unstable, and may mask 
state interests. 
 
Now that cases from central and eastern Europe are passing through the Convention 
system, the concerns expressed above can be addressed.  The next section gives two 
contentious examples of cases that have arisen recently.24 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
 
In both cases discussed here, the Court found for the respondent state.  The states’ 
margin of appreciation allows them some space within which to balance free 
expression against other important interests where a public figure is publicly 
insulted.25  These cases are contentious and potentially problematic because they 
could suggest that the notion of a margin of appreciation has indeed become a 
                                                 
24 The doctoral research from which this paper has developed examined all the cases concerning the 
new Contracting Parties from central and eastern Europe.  Finland was excluded from the survey 
because its recent history rendered it more comparable with its western and northern European 
neighbours rather than the rest of the former Eastern bloc.  Turkey was excluded because its situation is 
unique and not so directly concerned with the collapse of communism.  See Sweeney (n1)  
25 J McBride, ‘Judges, politicians and the limits to critical comment’ (1998) 23 Supp (Human Rights) 
ELR 76   
  
relativistic vehicle for subordinating human rights to local circumstances.  The later 
part of this paper will contest such a conclusion. 
 
In the case of Tammer v. Estonia26 the applicant journalist challenged his conviction 
for insulting a public figure.  In a published interview with another writer Tammer 
had used allegedly offensive words to criticise Vilja Laanaru.  Laanaru and the former 
Estonian prime minister had an affair, and Laanaru had their child.  She was unable to 
look after the child herself, and entrusted it to her parents.  Tammer’s comments 
related to another journalist’s plans to publish a biography of Laanaru.  Tammer used 
words which branded Laanaru as an unfit and careless mother who had deserted her 
children, and someone who was willing to break up another’s marriage.  The Estonian 
words have no direct translation into English.27    
 
The Government accepted that there had been an interference with Tammer’s freedom 
of expression, but argued that it was justified by reference to Article 10(2) ECHR.28  
The Court went on to hold that the interference was ‘prescribed by law’,29 in pursuit 
of ‘the protection of the reputation or rights of others’.30  It was still important to 
show that the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society.’   
 
The Court described the Government’s position as follows, 
                                                 
26 Tammer v Estonia (No. 2) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-I (2003) 37 EHRR 43 
27 ibid, para 22.  The case report contains the following footnote: “The translation of the Estonian 
words “abielulõhkuja” and “rongaema” is descriptive since no one-word equivalent exists in English.” 
28 ibid, para 33 
29 ibid, para 38 
30 ibid, para 40 
  
The Government stressed that the applicant had not been convicted for describing the factual 
situation or for expressing a critical opinion about Ms Laanaru’s personality or about her 
private or family life. His conviction was based on his choice of words in relation to her which 
were considered to be insulting…. 
 
The Government noted that the expressions [used] had a very special meaning in the Estonian 
language, and that they had no equivalent in English. When interpreting the words and their 
meaning their specific nature within the Estonian language and culture should also be taken 
into account.31 [Emphasis added] 
 
In Tammer the European Court eventually deferred to the opinion of the domestic 
courts, which had imposed upon Tammer a fine of ten day’s pay.  The Estonian courts 
had held that the words in question amounted to value judgements couched in 
offensive language, recourse to which was not necessary in order to express a 
negative opinion. 32  Tammer’s choice of words had overstepped the permissible 
limits of criticism, particularly since the comments related to Laanaru’s private rather 
than public life.  The European Court agreed that Tammer could have formulated his 
criticism of Laanaru’s actions without resorting to expressions that were so 
particularly offensive.  As a result of this, the domestic authorities had not failed 
adequately to balance Tammer’s free expression against Laanaru’s reputation.  Taking 
into account the measures imposed and Estonia’s margin of appreciation, the Court 
unanimously considered that the domestic authorities were, in the circumstances of 
                                                 
31 ibid, paras 52-53 
32 ibid, para 67 
  
the case, thus entitled to interfere with the exercise of the applicant’s right to free 
expression.33 
 
Before turning to the implications of this judgment, a second free expression case is 
introduced.  The applicant in Janowski v Poland34 was also by profession a journalist.  
He was convicted of insulting two municipal guards in a public square.  Janowski had 
seen the municipal guards attempting to move some street vendors from the square 
because it was not an authorised place for retail.  Janowski interjected on behalf of the 
vendors, arguing that the guards had no authority to move them.  In the course of his 
advice, Janowski called the municipal guards ‘dumb’ and ‘oafs’.35   
 
The applicant argued that his rights under Article 10 ECHR36 had been violated by his 
conviction for insulting the guards.  The Court held that there had been an 
interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 10,37 that the interference was 
prescribed by law,38 and that the restriction pursued the legitimate aim of preventing 
disorder.39  In this case, as in Tammer, the real area of debate was on the question of 
                                                 
33 ibid, para 69 
34 Janowski v Poland Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I (2000) 29 EHRR 705 
35 The terms used were ‘głupki’ and ‘ćwoki’ respectively.  
36 The applicant had also alleged violations of Arts 3, 6 and 7(1), but the European Commission 
declared those complaints inadmissible. 
37 Janowski v Poland (n34) paras 22-23 
38 ibid, para 24 
39 ibid, paras 25-26.  The government also contended that their aim was to protect the ‘reputation and 
rights of others’, namely the municipal guards.  Having examined the facts of the case and the 
reasoning of the domestic courts, the European Court felt the aim of preventing disorder was the 
dominant aim.   
  
whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society.’  Following the 
Court’s well-established methodology, in order to be ‘necessary’ the interference 
would have to answer a ‘pressing social need’, be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
invoked, and be supported by reasons that were both relevant and sufficient.   
 
Significantly Janowski argued that, since he was a journalist, his conviction had been 
taken by others as a sign that the authorities were re-introducing censorship such as 
had been common under communism.  He felt that this might mean that future 
criticism of the state and its apparatus would be discouraged.40  Such an argument 
clearly invited the Court and Commission to take into account the particular 
conditions of the newly democratic Poland.   
 
The European Commission in Janowski had acknowledged that civil servants such as 
the municipal guards acting in their official capacity were, like politicians, subject to 
wider acceptable limits of criticism than private parties.  In the context of the heated 
exchange, the Commission formed the view that those limits had not been 
overstepped by applicant.41  The government responded to this, arguing before the 
Court that the applicant’s comments had not formed any part of a public debate, but 
were confined to the particular situation.  In the light of this they argued that the 
applicant’s profession as a journalist was irrelevant.  The Court agreed with the 
government.   
                                                 
40 ibid, para 27  
41 It must be noted that the Commission was split 8/7 in favour a finding a violation of the Convention.  
There was therefore a significant minority of Commissioners that felt the boundaries of the state’s 
margin had not been overstepped in this case: Janowski v Poland (Application 25716/94) (1997) 
(ECommHR) 
  
 The Court noted that it did not even have to balance public order against a wider 
public interest in political criticism because Janowski’s remarks were not made in his 
professional capacity.42  It was also important that the applicant had been convicted 
on the basis of his use of insulting words, and not simply for making critical remarks.  
Such had been confirmed by both national courts,43 and therefore the Court was not 
convinced the Polish authorities’ actions could be likened to censorship.  Moreover 
the applicant’s sentence had been reduced on appeal and his prison sentence quashed.  
For these reasons the European Court concluded that the national authorities had not 
overstepped their margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of the contested 
measure.  There was no violation of Article 10. 44  
 
It is difficult not to have some sympathy with Mr Janowski, who clearly felt his 
intervention on behalf of the street vendors was for the public good.  It should 
therefore be added at this stage that the Grand Chamber of the Court in Janowski was 
by no means unanimous in its decision to contradict the Commission.  A majority of 
12 to 5 found no violation of Article 10 and the President of the Court, Judge 
Wildhaber, was in the minority.  Space precludes detailed analysis of the dissenting 
opinions, although in summary each disagrees that the applicant’s prosecution and 
subsequent fine were ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 10(2).  The core of the 
dissentients’ argument was that the criminal legislation applied to Mr Janowski was 
overbroad in that it protected civil servants from criticism even where they exceeded 
                                                 
42 Janowski (n34) para 32 
43 ibid 
44 ibid para 35   
  
their lawful authority.  Judge Bonello was particularly concerned that in approving the 
Polish authorities’ position,  
‘the Court […] broadcast a signal that it deems the verbal intemperance of a choleric to be 
more open to disapproval than the infringement of the rule of law by those who are assigned 
to defend it.’   
 
These arguments are quite compelling, and should provoke discussion about the 
ECtHR’s attitude to free expression in fledgling democracies where official authority 
has frequently been used in the past to disguise corruption.  However, for the purposes 
of this article it is interesting to note the dissention did not centre upon the cultural or 
contextual elements to the case.  The closest to such an argument is contained in the 
short Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wildhaber, who, in coming to the conclusion that 
the interference was not necessary in a democratic society, described the words used 
by Mr Janowski as merely “moderately insulting”.  By contrast, the majority had 
relied upon the findings of the national court that the words used constituted 
“offensive and abusive verbal attacks”.45  Whilst in Janowski the Court had used the 
margin of appreciation doctrine to take local conditions into account less explicitly 
than it was asked to in Tammer, the majority must have placed more emphasis on the 
local interpretation of the words used than did Judge Wildhaber.  The Court was 
therefore sensitive in both Tammer and Janowski to a local interpretation of the 
contested words’ connotations.  The seriousness of the insulting words used in each 
case underpins, explicitly or implicitly, the Court’s attempts to balance the other 
interests at stake. 
 
                                                 
45 ibid para 34 
  
ASSESSING THE CASES 
 
These two cases present a potentially significant problem.  It could be argued quite 
easily that allowing divergence in the way states choose to limit human rights 
amounts to modulation of the rights’ essential character.  The margin conceded in 
Tammer and Janowski may have allowed restrictions on human rights that would not 
be permitted in other Contracting Parties.  This could suggest that the Court’s use of 
the doctrine is indeed unduly relativistic, and confirms a worrying new trend in the 
European Court’s jurisprudence.    
 
Having identified these cases and the nature of the problem, the rebuttal of these 
concerns can be made in three steps.  Firstly, an examination of the outcome of cases 
decided by the European Court in which the recognition of a margin of appreciation 
has played a role, and which also involve states from central and eastern Europe, 
shows that the Court has been far from deferential to the new Contracting Parties.  
Secondly, it is necessary to clarify what it really means to state that human rights are 
universal.  If even universal human rights contain some local modifications, then the 
ECHR’s approach is not necessarily relativistic.  Thirdly, and finally, if it can be 
shown that the nature and basis of the margin of appreciation is not relativistic, then 
its use to accommodate local concerns in a limited number of cases is entirely 
compatible with universality.  The doctrine’s conceptual roots can be found in a form 
of ethical de-centralisation or subsidiarity46 rather than cultural relativism.   
 
                                                 
46 cf G Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international human rights law’ 97 AJIL 
(2003) 38   
  
The next parts of the paper address each of these three steps in turn, in the light of the 
case law already introduced. 
 
CASES CONCERNING THE NEW CONTRACTING PARTIES 
 
The two illustrative cases should be seen in the overall context of the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence.  The Court’s general approach to these states can then be compared 
with its attitude to the original contacting parties.  
 
The first case the Court ever decided on its merits was Lawless in 1961.47  This was 
eight years after the Convention came into effect.  It was not until the 1968 case of 
Neumeister48 that the Court actually found against a respondent state, disclosing a 
violation of Article 5(3).49   It had taken the Court fifteen years to find against a 
respondent state.  Compared to its present workload and robust judgments, the Court’s 
early operation was a slow and cautious business.50   
 
It is also important to recall that the margin of appreciation doctrine may not have 
played the same role at each point in the Convention’s life.  The Court’s recognition 
                                                 
47 Lawless v Ireland (no. 3) Series A No 3 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 15 
48 Neumeister v Austria Series A No 8 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 91 
49 Nevertheless Neumeister was only the third case that the Court had examined on its merits.  The 
second, De Becker v Belgium Series A No 4 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 43, was struck off the list because the 
impugned law was altered by the time that the Court heard the case. 
50 M Janis, R Kay, A Bradley, European human rights law, (Oxford OUP 2000) 25 
  
of the margin played a role in consolidating the Convention system in its infancy.51  
However since around 1979 the margin has evolved into a useful framework to 
facilitate heightened analysis of states’ justification for interference with Convention 
rights.52  The role played by the margin has developed over a period of at least 
twenty-five years.    
 
Hungary was the first of the central and eastern European countries to join the 
Convention system, in 1990.  It was Bulgaria (which joined the Council of Europe in 
1992) that first had a case against it decided on the merits.  In the 1997 case of 
Lukanov v Bulgaria,53 concerning the arrest and detention of a former Prime Minister 
of Bulgaria, the European Court found a violation of Article 5(2).  Thus it was only 
five years between Bulgaria’s joining the system and it feeling the full force of the 
Court.  Since then the Court has had a steady stream of cases concerning the new 
Contracting Parties, having decided cases concerning Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  As of the 21st October 2004, no 
judgments have yet been issued concerning Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, or Serbia & Montenegro.   
 
                                                 
51 Y Arai-Takahashi, The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of proportionality in the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR, (Oxford Intersentia 2002) 232 recognises this, but argues that as a 
“transitional” doctrine alone contemporary use of the margin cannot adequately be defended.  
52 H Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence (The Hague Kluwer 1996) 
53 Lukanov v Bulgaria Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II (1997) 24 EHRR 121  
  
In the overwhelming number of cases emanating from central and eastern Europe 
which have been declared admissible a violation of at least one article of the 
Convention has been established.54  The Court first examined the new Contracting 
Parties’ margin of appreciation in four cases in 1999, including the Janowski case 
amongst them.55  In each of the first three cases the Court found for the respondent 
state, which could certainly suggest that the Court was willing to take a more 
deferential approach to the new Contracting Parties, potentially in order to aid their 
transition to full participation in the Convention system.  Whilst this would achieve 
historical parity with its behaviour towards the original Contracting Parties, the 
internal consistency of the Court’s contemporary jurisprudence would be threatened.   
 
In the fourth of the first four cases, Dalban v Romania, the Court found that the 
respondent state had overstepped its margin.  Indeed since Dalban the Court has 
found for the respondent state in very few cases where the margin of appreciation 
doctrine was discussed, including the Janowski and Tammer cases.56  These cases 
                                                 
54 ‘Survey of activities 2003’ (Council of Europe) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/2003SURVEYCOURT.pdf> (15 October 2004), 32 gives a 
snapshot of the Court’s activities.  This pattern is in line with Court’s approach to the other Contracting 
Parties; once a complaint has been declared admissible it is often decided in favour of the applicant.  In 
2003 a violation of at least one Convention article was found in 521 out of the 548 cases that gave rise 
to a finding on the merits. 
55 Janowski v Poland (n34); Rekvényi v Hungary Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III (2000) 
30 EHRR 519; Matter v Slovakia Application 31434/96 (2001) 31 EHRR 32; Dalban v Romania 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VI (2001) 31 EHRR 39 
56 In chronological order: Janowski v Poland, (n34); Rekvényi v Hungary (n55); Matter v Slovakia 
(n55); Constantinescu v Romania Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-VIII (2001) 33 EHRR 33; 
Tammer v Estonia (No. 2) (n23); Gorzelik v Poland Application no. 44158/98 (2004) 38 EHRR 4 (NB 
  
amount to less than a third of the cases against the central and eastern European states 
involving supervision of their margin of appreciation.  
 
In several of the cases where application of the margin of appreciation doctrine to one 
of the rights at issue resulted in a finding for the state, the Court nevertheless found a 
violation of another substantive Convention right.  For example in Matter v Slovakia 
the Court held that the state’s interference with Article 8 was justified, but found a 
violation of Article 6(1).  Likewise in Constantinescu v Romania the Court upheld the 
respondent state’s interference with Article 10, but found a violation of Article 6(1). 57   
 
The Janowski and Tammer cases thus fall into a very small category of cases where, 
having applied the concept of a margin of appreciation to one or more aspects of the 
case, the Court failed to find any violation of the Convention.  The Court’s activity in 
general and use of the margin of appreciation doctrine in particular has thus not 
displayed a marked restraint such as would suggests a weakening of the system’s 
internal consistency.  The Court has been much quicker to act against the central and 
eastern European states than it was against the original members of the Council of 
Europe. 
                                                                                                                                            
This decision has been reaffirmed by a Grand Chamber, see Gorzelik v Poland Application no 
44158/98 Judgment of the Court 17.2.2004); Lesnik v Slovakia Application no. 35640/97; 4 similar 
cases against Ukraine decided on 29.4.2003: Nazarenko Application No. 39483/98, Dankevich (2004) 
38 EHRR 25, Aliev, Application No. 41220/98, Khokhlich Application No. 41707/98; Blecic v Croatia 
Application No. 59532/00; Kopecky v Slovakia Application No. 44912/98  
57 The four cases brought against Ukraine and decided on 29.4.2003 (n56) also disclosed several 
violations of the Convention, even though some of the complaints under Article 8 were dismissed using 
margin of appreciation analysis.   
  
 In respect of the original states the Court balanced human rights against state 
sovereignty more warily.  Whilst participation in the ECHR system is still new to the 
Council’s recently joined members, the idea of submission to an international Court is 
not as novel as it was for the original Contracting Parties.  The Court’s willingness to 
act against the new Contracting Parties is predicated upon its proven ability to act 
against the early participants in the system.  For many years, the only states capable of 
being found in violation of the Convention were western European states.  The new 
Contracting Parties have witnessed the European Court act decisively against the very 
states that initiated the system, so they may be less suspicious than the original 
participants that the Convention would be used merely as a political tool. 
 
UNIVERSALITY NOT UNIFORMITY 
 
The cases introduced above are clearly in a minority of the European Court’s recent 
decisions.  In order to analyse fully the threat to universality that cases such as 
Tammer and Janowski pose the nature of universality itself should be questioned.  
Universality is not the same as uniformity, 58 and so local variations in the 
Conventions standards may fall short of outright relativism.  The 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action provides a useful summary of the UN’s 
position, 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional 
                                                 
58 J S Davidson ‘Human Rights, Universality and Cultural Relativity: In Search of a Middle Way’  6 
Human Rights Law and Practice (2001) 97  
  
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to 
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.59 [emphasis added]  
   
There has been discussion of the italicised section of the quotation,60 but it should be 
taken as meaning that although human rights must be understood within their cultural 
context, they should not be subsumed under cultural practices.  It is to be expected, 
nevertheless, that even whilst maintaining ‘universal’ human rights, there may be 
some defensible local qualification.  Critics of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
who believe they have identified relativism in its operation may have instead merely 
identified examples where the European Court has borne in mind the local and 
regional particularities of given states.  This does not amount to a denial of 
universality.     
 
Since the differences acknowledged by the recognition of a national margin of 
appreciation do not necessarily amount to relativism, another explanation for the 
Court’s position is required.  Michael Walzer’s approach to thick and thin conceptions 
of morality can be adapted to elaborate on the nature of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. 
 
THICK AND THIN 
 
                                                 
59 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN DOC. A/CONF.157/23 (12.7.1993); (1993) 
HRLJ 352, para 5 
60 M Freeman, ‘Human rights and real cultures’, 1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (1998) 25, 
25 
  
Michael Walzer61 has argued that moral terms have ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ 
meanings; that ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ accounts of them can be given.62  Thick and thin 
moralities serve different purposes at different times, working in conjunction rather 
than contradicting each other.  They exist contemporaneously, and it is the interaction 
between them that is seen when the European Court applies the margin of 
appreciation doctrine. 
 
In order to explain the meaning of this dual account of morality, Walzer described 
having seen footage of anti-Communist protesters in Prague in 1989, carrying banners 
bearing slogans such as ‘truth’ and ‘justice’.  When they waved their banners, Walzer 
argued that they were not relativists – it was their hope that everyone, in any place in 
the world, should associate with and support their cause.  The moral concerns here 
were expressed ‘thinly’ and were of broad international appeal.63  However, after the 
‘velvet revolution’ 64 in November 1989 the same people, still presumably as clear in 
their pursuit of truth and justice, were more immediately concerned with what was 
best for the ordering of their society in the post-Communist era, in the light of their 
history and culture.  In addressing the issues of designing or modifying a healthcare or 
education system, or whether Czechoslovakia should remain united, they did not 
insist with the same passion that the rest of the world endorse or reiterate their 
                                                 
61 Walzer (n4) 
62 This element of Walzer’s work is not unique, though his interpretation of it is.  See eg C Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures (New York Basic Books 1972), chapter 1, ‘Thick Description: Toward an 
interpretive theory of culture’. 
63 Walzer (n4) 3 
64 So called because it took place peacefully   
  
decisions.65  These moral considerations were part of a complex thick morality bound 
up with the shared history and experiences of the actual people living in that particular 
society. 
 
The idea of a moral minimalism does not, for Walzer, describe an emotionally 
shallow or substantively minor morality.  He has argued that,   
[moral minimalism] is morality close to the bone.  There isn’t much that is more important 
than “truth” and “justice”, minimally understood.  The minimal demands that we make on one 
another are, when denied, repeated with passionate insistence.  In moral discourse, thinness 
and intensity go together, whereas with thickness comes qualification, compromise, 
complexity, and disagreement.66   
 
Walzer has warned that however intuitively appealing it may be, it is incorrect to 
suggest that pre-existing thinly constituted universal moral principles have, over time, 
been elaborated ‘thickly’ in the light of specific historical circumstances.  This 
differentiates Walzer’s views from other moral philosophers who have also used the 
terms ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ in this context.  Morality is instead ‘thick from the beginning, 
culturally integrated, fully resonant and it reveals itself thinly only on special 
occasions, when moral language is turned to specific purposes.’67   
 
For example there is in the world some agreement on the importance of living 
together in relative harmony, but in times of upheaval (or shortly afterwards) people 
may be moved to express some of the core elements of these previously un-stated 
                                                 
65 Walzer (n4) 4 
66 ibid 6 
67 ibid 4 
  
assumptions.  Applied to the human rights context it can be argued that the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the expression of thin 
aspects of morality stated in the aftermath of World War II, but which actually existed 
as elements of differing particular thick moralities well before this.68   
 
The recognition that human rights can be understood thickly and thinly is significant 
because in all but the paradigm cases of flagrant human rights abuse, human rights 
protection needs more than the examination of compliance with simple imperatives.  
It requires also an understanding of the multitude of actors in society, each with their 
different interests and values.  National and international institutions must recognise 
that therefore, in the first place, the social and political institutions of particular 
societies must deal with much of the actual protection of human rights.  This is the 
prescription of a gamut of positive action by all states to protect human rights, 
coupled with international institutions recognising some realistic limits to their own 
competence.   
     
The position advocated here thus recognises a margin within which different thickly 
constituted efforts at the protection of human rights exist.  Human rights are generally 
universal, but in becoming embedded in society some local particularities affect the 
substantiation of human rights and result in specific qualifications.  It is the 
interaction of thick and thin concepts of human rights that recognition of a margin of 
                                                 
68 Walzer also notes that even an agreed minimal morality will often be forced into the idiom of a 
maximal morality, (Walzer (n4) 9), which may explain why some cultures find the objective of human 
rights familiar but their expression as ‘rights’ alien.  
  
appreciation facilitates rather than the relativist subordination of human rights to local 
culture.69 
 
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND SUBSIDIARITY 
 
It has so far been argued that the cases such as Janowski and Tammer belong to a very 
small group of cases where the European Court has used margin of appreciation 
analysis and found for the respondent state.  Walzer’s work has been used to suggest 
that universal human rights are poised to recognise local variations because they are 
in fact a concentrated product of those diffuse cultures rather than a challenge to 
them.  This section of the paper elaborates upon how the Walzerian paradigm can be 
linked to the concept of subsidiarity.   
 
The deference to action within a state’s margin expresses a form of subsidiarity, 
where on certain types of question the Court can devolve to Contracting Parties 
supervised discretionary powers to balance human rights and national public interests 
within confined parameters.  This contains elements of ‘ethical decentralisation’, 
inasmuch as decentralisation carries with it the notion of delegation where the diffuse 
lower authorities remain loyal to the centre.  
 
                                                 
69 The extent to which Walzer’s work, his earlier writing in particular, is or is not relativist is moot; M 
Walzer, Spheres of Justice: a defence of pluralism and equality (New York Basic Books 1983).  The 
position taken in this article is that Thick and Thin adds a universalist dimension to Walzer’s idea of 
‘Spheres of Justice’; cf R Bellamy ‘Justice in the community: Walzer on pluralism, equality and 
democracy’ in D Boucher & P Kelly (eds) Social Justice: From Hume to Walzer (Routledge London 
1998)   
  
In the European Convention context the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is normally 
understood in its institutional sense.  The intended effect of the ECHR is to encourage 
states to bring their domestic law into conformity with the standards of the 
Convention, rather than for the Convention rights to be relied on directly.  Human 
rights ought to be protected by national authorities, rather than by the Strasbourg 
institutions.  In this sense the principle of subsidiarity is used to express that the 
Convention mechanisms are subsidiary to the activities of the Contracting Parties 
themselves.  This observation is supported by the terms of the Convention, and has 
been consistently re-affirmed by the Court.70 
 
The principle of subsidiarity in this institutional sense clearly results from the division 
of power between national and international institutions.71  In addition to factors such 
as the separation of powers that affect all courts, the international institutional context 
of European Convention law thus adds another dimension.72  This international 
separation of responsibilities is closely linked to subsidiarity in so far as both concern 
                                                 
70 Handyside (n17) para 48; Z and Others v UK Reports of Judgment and Decisions 2001-V (2002) 34 
EHRR 3, para 103; Subsidiarity is more commonly associated with law of the European Union (Art 5 
EC Treaty; Art 1 Treaty on European Union).  Further discussion of the EU context of subsidiarity is 
outside the scope of the present paper, but is discussed in my paper ‘Universal values in an expanded 
EU: re-assessing the case-law on derogations from the four freedoms’ delivered at the Socio-Legal 
Studies Conference in Glasgow, April 2004 (copy with author). 
71 cf P Mahoney, ‘Marvellous richness of diversity or invidious cultural relativism’ 19(1) Human 
Rights Law Journal (1998) 1 who describes the margin itself in these terms 
72 E Brems ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 56 Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches offenthiches recht und volkerrecht (1996) 240, 293 
  
the allocation of responsibilities, and therefore impact upon the balance between 
international human rights supervision and state sovereignty.73   
 
It terms of the practical allocation of responsibility the Court has objected to being 
seen as a court of fourth instance, and it will usually respect findings of law and fact 
by national courts.74  However there is another element of subsidiarity that cannot be 
explained on solely practical grounds.  To understand this, the differing roles of the 
Court must be acknowledged.    
 
The Court’s most obvious or classic role is to guard against flagrant human rights 
abuses, but it is not its only one.  Indeed the maturation of the Convention system has 
seen it evolve complex jurisprudence on almost all aspects of public life. The 
Convention therefore offers protection from human rights abuses at two levels.75  In 
its classic role it protects against ‘naked, bad faith abuse of power’.76  In this sense, 
the Convention clearly required from the outset a standard of human rights, thinly 
constituted, in response to the recent horrors of WWII.  However in protecting human 
rights the European Court also (and more frequently) has to deal with restrictions 
imposed in the name of the general interest, and which whilst impacting 
disproportionately on the individual, were imposed in good faith.  According to 
Mahoney,  
                                                 
73 Carozza (n46) 63 
74 Edwards v UK Series A No 247 (1993) 15 EHRR 417, para 34; R Macdonald, F Matscher, & H 
Petzold (eds), The European system for the protection of human rights (Dordrecht Martinus Nijhof 
1993), 50 
75 Mahoney (n71) 2-3 
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It is only in this second context, once the first degree of protection has been assured, that the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation comes into play, that is to say, only if the preliminary 
conditions of normal democratic governance have been shown to exist.77  
 
This is quite correct, but should not be taken merely as a test for determining when 
the margin is allowed to operate.  Instead, Mahoney’s observation encourages 
examination of the cases’ character.  If the ‘good faith’ curtailment of human rights is 
a consequence of balancing between conflicting national public interests within a 
democracy, then it can be said to take place within the thick elaboration of human 
rights in particular societies.  These questions are not so much to do with subsidiarity 
and the correct allocation of responsibilities on practical grounds, but concern respect 
for moral and ethical sovereignty and self determination.       
 
The determination of the national public interest requires detailed knowledge of the 
domestic situation, and so a margin may also be conceded on practical grounds.  
Nevertheless the sorts of questions that must be asked and answered about conflicting 
public interests usually involve issues relating to rights-in-detail rather than rights in 
the abstract; the realisation of human rights thickly constituted.  It is in response to 
these questions within human rights thickly constituted that the margin plays its role 
in the decentralisation of certain moral and ethical questions. 
 
This is the situation exemplified in the Janowski and Tammer cases, where the 
respondent states accepted that they had interfered with a human right, and therefore 
did not seek to dispute the interpretation or relevance of the right at stake.  In both 
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cases it was the relative weight of the right and a countervailing public interest that 
the national authorities sought to establish for themselves78 when they applied the 
right to the case at hand.  The justification for respecting the respondent state’s 
margin is not cultural relativism.  In fact it is quite the opposite; it is that the state is 
coming to its own conclusions within a realistic, diffuse, universal concept of human 
rights. 
 
The process of decentralising is still however constrained by the Court’s classic role, 
the protection of human rights thinly constituted.  Even where a wide margin is 
invoked and discussed, the review function of the European Court is not ousted.79  
The principle of proportionality is a valuable tool in determining the outer limits of 
the margin in particular cases.80  Whilst the Walzerian paradigm explains that the 
margin of appreciation doctrine may play a role in respecting some choices about 
balancing national public interests, a gross miscalculation of their relative weight 
could still amount to a violation of the Convention.   
 
                                                 
78 ie by supplying reasons that were both “relevant and sufficient”; See Olsson v Sweden (no.1) Series 
A No 130 (1989) 11 EHRR 259 para 68; Lingens v Austria Series A No 103 (1986) 8 EHRR 103 para 
40 
79 For example in Open Door and Dublin Well-Woman v Ireland the Court found a violation of Art 10 
and stated that it ‘cannot agree [with the respondent state] that the State's discretion in the field of the 
protection of morals is unfettered and unreviewable….’  This is significant because on questions of 
morals the margin conceded is usually relatively wide;  Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland 
Series A No 246-A (1993) 15 EHRR 244, para 68  
80 Arai-Takahashi (n51) 190-205 
  
In summary the principle of subsidiarity is already recognised as being central to an 
understanding of the European Court’s role.  It has also frequently been linked to the 
margin of appreciation.  Within the idea of subsidiarity there is a narrow range of 
decisions about the correct level of human rights supervision that are moral or ethical 
rather than practical in nature.  Whilst the concept of a national margin of 
appreciation may play a role in respect of subsidiarity in its practical institutional 
sense, it also has a role to play in respecting choices made within each European 
state’s thickly constituted morality. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Returning to the two cases introduced above, alongside other recent cases it can be 
concluded firstly that they do not herald a new transitional era of excessive deference 
to the new Contracting Parties from central and Eastern Europe.   
 
Secondly, since uniformity is not required by universality, the limitations permitted in 
the Janowski and Tammer cases do not necessarily undermine universality.  Indeed on 
closer examination the variation which the Court used the margin of appreciation to 
recognise could not be described as being based upon cultural relativism at all.  The 
cases do not suggest that, for whatever historical or cultural reason, free expression is 
not a value of relevance in Estonia or Poland.  In neither case did the respondent state 
attempt to argue that the right itself was inapplicable to the situation.   
 
Thirdly it is now clear that the two cases expose questions relating to rights-in-detail; 
they concern ‘good-faith’ interference with human rights in furtherance of other 
  
  
collective interests.  In these circumstances considerations of institutional subsidiarity 
and ethical decentralisation justify in principle the existence and use of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.  This, in turn, justifies the Court taking giving weight to the 
local meaning of the words at issue in Janowski and Tammer as part of its balancing 
exercise.  The way that the doctrine was used in the Janowski and Tammer cases 
shows a careful examination of the facts of each case, so that the discretion devolved 
to the respondent states in each was checked in order to guarantee loyalty to the 
concept of human rights thinly constituted.  There was no question of automatic 
deference.  The margin of appreciation doctrine is a structured, meaningful, but 
ultimately conditional recognition of Contracting Parties' complex thickly constituted 
morality.    
 
By examining two illustrative cases in their wider context, this paper has suggested 
that the European Court’s continued recognition of a margin of appreciation has not 
resulted in a relativistic Court or the lowering of Convention standards.  The 
doctrine’s use has been presented as a valuable tool for recognising and 
accommodating limited local variations within a nevertheless universal model of 
human rights.   
